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Abstract
Secure multiparty computation is basically about techniques that allow
multiple parties to jointly carry out computations that are based on data from
each of the players while the data held by each player remains private to that
player. Since the beginning of the notion of secure multiparty computation,
many algorithms and methods were introduced on how to achieve this goal.
This thesis first introduces different methods to do secure multiparty com-
putation and later focusing on Secret sharing based multiparty computation
it explains how efficient and secure multiparty operations can be done. Also
while introducing secret sharing based secure multiparty computation we in-
troduce a novel technique which allows to do secure multiparty computation
using the Asmuth Bloom secret sharing scheme, which is not possible in the
original scheme. The aim of this thesis is the design and implementation
of a programming language and libraries for secure multiparty computation,
SecurePL. We show that our tool’s ease of use and security allows even a
person who has absolutely no knowledge about security or cryptography to
write applications that can do secure multiparty computation.
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Özet
Güvenli çok partili hesaplama basitçe, birden fazla partinin her partiden
gelen bilgileri kullanarak ortaklaşa hesap yapmasına izin veren metodlar ile
ilgilidir. Öyle ki bu hesaplamalar sonucunda her partinin bilgisi kendisinde
saklı kalmaktadır. Güvenli çok partili hesaplama kavramının ortaya atıldıg˜ı
günden beri, bu amaca ulaşmak için bir çok algoritma ve metod geliştirildi.
Bu tez öncelikle güvenli çok partili hesaplamaya izin veren farklı metodları
tanıtıp, daha sonra sır paylasımı bazlı güvenli çok partili hesaplama yontem-
leri uzerine odaklaşıp, bu hesaplamaların nasıl verimli yapılabileceg˜ini açıkla-
maktadır. Ayrıca sır paylaşımı bazlı güvenli çok partili hesaplama konusu an-
latılırken, Asmuth Bloom sır paylaşım yonteminin orjinal şeklinde mümkün
olmayan guvenli çok partili hesaplama’ya izin veren yeni bir teknik tanı-
tacag˜iz. Bu tezin amacı güvenli cok partili hesaplama yapmak icin kullanıla-
bilecek bir programlama dili ve kütüphane tasarlayıp uygulamaktır. Bizim
aracımızın kullanım kolaylıg˜ı ve güvenlig˜i sayesinde, güvenlik veya kriptoloji
hakkında hiçbir bilgisi olmayan bir insanin bile güvenli çok partili hesaplama
yapabileceg˜ini gostereceg˜iz.
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1 Introduction
In this section we introduce the concept of secure multiparty computation.
After the introduction to secure multiparty computation we will focus on
different methods to do secure multiparty computation. After secure mul-
tiparty computation, the concepts of compiler design will be introduced to
give some insight about the toolbox that will later be introduced in chapter
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1.1 Secure Multiparty Computation
Let f be a function that takes n input elements and after computation gives
n output elements . Secure multiparty computation is focused on methods
such that, participating parties P1, P2, ..., Pn where each party Pi knows the
input xi can compute the function
f(x1, x2, x3, ..., xn) = (y1, y2, y3, ..., yn)
together such that each party Pi learns only yi of the result and has absolutely
no information regarding the other components of the result. The public
function f can be anything i.e. arithmetic operations, logical operations,
comparison etc. For calculating any arbitrary function there are different
methods that could be used like circuit evaluation or secret sharing protocols.
in this section different approaches to secure multiparty computation will be
introduced.
1
1.1.1 Yao’s multiparty Computation Protocol
The protocol explained in this section is based on Lindell and Pinkas’ paper:
A proof of Yao’s protocol for secure two party computation. [10]
Garbled Truth Tables and Garbled Circuits
Let f be a polynomial time function. Then the first step for Yao’s protocol is
to view the function f as a boolean circuit C. For evaluating a boolean circuit
C with inputs x and y from two players a gate by gate evaluation needs to
be done from the input wires to the output wires. Once the incoming wires
to a gate g have obtained the values αβ ∈ {0, 1}, it is possible to give the
outgoing wires of the gate the value g(α, β). finally the output of circuit
would be given based on the outputs on the output wires of the circuit. So
computing in a circuit is allocating the appropriate zero-one values to the
wires of the circuit.
A high level definition of Yao’s protocol is a construction that is actu-
ally a compiler that takes any polynomial time function f , or the circuit C
that is actually calculating the function f , and constructs a protocol that
calculates the function f securely in the presence of semi-honest adversaries.
The basic idea behind Yao’s protocol is to build a circuit that only input and
output wires are visible to the players. To achieve this two random values
are specified to each wire so that one value represents 0 and the other one
represents 1. For instance let ω be the label of a wire and for that wire two
values k1ω and k0ω are chosen where the first represents the bit 1 while the
second represents the bit 0. Since the values are random, even if one players
sees the value kρω the player cannot find out if ρ is 0 or 1. But also since the
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values on a wire are just random values, in a setup where a gate g has two
input wires ω1 and ω2 and one output wire ω3, it is not possible to evaluate
the gate with inputs kρω1 and k
σ
ω2
because there is no information in the input
about ρ and σ values. To overcome this problem we need to use “garbled
truth tables” which take random values as inputs and give random values as
output. But while receiving one output on the output wire the player must
have no information about the other output that could have been produced
by the other wire. To do this the four different values that can be an input
for a gate k1ω1 , k
0
ω1
, k1ω2 , k
0
ω2
have to be used as encryption keys. After a chain
of decryptions the player would get either k0ω3 or k
1
ω3
. Based on this setup an
example of a truth table of an OR gate would be like:
Input wire ω1 Input wire ω2 Output wire ω3 Garbled Encryption Table
k01 k
0
2 k
0
3 Ek01(Ek02(k
0
3))
k02 k
1
2 k
1
3 Ek01(Ek12(k
1
3))
k12 k
0
2 k
1
3 Ek11(Ek02(k
1
3))
k12 k
1
2 k
1
3 Ek11(Ek12(k
1
3))
Table 1: Garbled OR gate truth table
Since all the outputs are encrypted when evaluating the gate for input
incoming from input wires and getting an output the player would have no
information whatsoever about the other output .
Till now we described only how to create one garbled gate. a garbled
circuit is made up of garbled gates and also has a output decryption table.
the aim of this table is to map the result from the output wires of the circuit
back to real values. So after an evaluation a result of kγr can be converted to
a 0 or 1 values depending on the output table .
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Oblivious Transfer and 1 out-of 2 Oblivious Transfer
In cryptography an oblivious transfer protocol is a protocol by which a sender
sends some information to the receiver, but is oblivious as to which informa-
tion is received by the receiver. In a 1 out of 2 oblivious transfer protocol the
sender has two messages m0 and m1 and the receiver has a bit β. The re-
ceiver then wants to receive the message mβ without getting any information
about m1−β and without the sender learning β.
The protocol for 1 out of 2 oblivious transfer by Even, Goldreich and
Lempel is a generic protocol but can be instantiated using RSA as follows:
1. The sender generates RSA parameters including the modulus N , the
public exponent e, private exponent d and two public messages α0 and
α1 and sends N, e, α0, α1 to the receiver.
2. The receiver picks a random value r, encrypts r, adds αβ, where β is
either 0 or 1 depending on which message the receiver wants to get, to
the encryption of r and sends the result q back to the sender.
3. The sender computes k0 to be the decryption of q − α0 and k1 to be
the decryption of q − α1 and sends m0 + k0 and m1 + k1 back to the
receiver.
4. The receiver knows kβ and subtracts this value from the corresponding
part of the message received to get mβ
4
The Protocol
Based on the protocols on generating a garbled circuit and 1 out of 2 oblivious
transfer we can now make the formal definition of Yao’s protocol. In this
protocol the sender generates a garbled circuit and sends it to the other
party, henceforth the receiver. The sender and receiver then interact so that
the receiver obtains the input wire keys that are associated with the input.
The interaction between the sender and receiver is done by a 1 out of 2
oblivious transfer protocol so that the sender has absolutely no information
about the input that the receiver is using for the circuit. After receiving the
input values the receiver evaluates the circuit while always using 1 out-of
2 oblivious transfer protocol for additional input requested from the player
that constructed the circuit[10, 1, 15].
1.1.2 Secret Sharing Based multiparty Computation Protocol
Secure multiparty computation based on secret sharing is a method which
allows more than two parties to do information theoretically secure computa-
tion. the main difference between secret sharing method and Yao’s method is
that for any polynomial arithmetic function f , in secret sharing based secure
multiparty computation there is no need to do any conversion of the function
f to a circuit C. Secret sharing based secure multiparty computation is based
on the principle of sharing an input secret α among n players and evaluate
the polynomial arithmetic function f based on these secret shares, and when
the secret shares are combined back the player gets f(α) instead of α. Secret
sharing based secure multiparty computation will be explained later in more
detail in section 2 including how to do secure multiparty computation for
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each secret sharing scheme since the current implemented secure multiparty
computation libraries in SecurePL are all secret sharing based.
1.1.3 Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption is a form of encryption where a player can do a form
of algebraic operation on plain text by doing algebraic operations on cipher
text. Homomorphic encryption systems are all malleable by design, which
means it is possible for an adversary to transform a ciphertext into another
ciphertext which decrypts to a related plaintext. So homomorphic encryption
systems might be deemed as not secure for data transfers.Even though this
seems to be an unsuited property for an encryption system, the property of
being malleable allows different players to do algebraic operations on secret
inputs without revealing the data thus doing secure multiparty computation.
Some example encryption systems that allow secure multiparty operations
are
• RSA cryptosystem
• El Gamal Cryptosystem
• Goldwasser Micali Cryptosystem
• Benaloh Cryptosystem
• Paillier Cryptosystem
Examples:
In these examples E(α) denotes the cipher text of the plain text α
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Unpadded RSA Cryptosystem: For public keys n and e the encryption
of a plain text would be E(α) = αe mod n. And the homomorphic property
would be:
E(α1)× E(α2) = αe1 × αe2 mod n = (α1 × α2)e mod n = E(α1 × α2 mod n)
Goldwasser Micali Cryptosystem: For public modulus n and quadratic
residue x the encryption of a bit β would be E(β) = r2xβ mod n.And the
homomorphic property would be:
E(β1)×E(β2) = r21xβ1× r22xβ2 mod n = (r1× r2)2xβ1+β2 mod n = E(β1⊕β2)
Paillier Cryptosystem: For public key modulus n and and base g the
encryption of a message α would be E(α) = gαrn mod n2 . and the homo-
morphic property would be:
E(α1)×E(α2) = gα1rn1×gα2rn2 mod n2 = gα1+α2(r1r2)n mod n2 = E(α1+α2 mod n)
Even though there are homomorphic cryptosystems to do addition or mul-
tiplication using only encrypted values as inputs, there is still no encryption
system that allows both addition and multiplication using only encrypted
values as input.
1.2 Compiler Design
Simply explained a compiler is a program that reads a program written in
one language called the source language and translates this to an equivalent
7
program in another language called destination language. There are thou-
sands of source languages, ranging from traditional programming languages
such as FORTRAN to specialized languages. Destination languages are also
varied; a target language can be a machine language of any computer be-
tween a microprocessor to a supercomputer or can be something else than
machine code at all. Since machine code is just another programming lan-
guage compilers can be also called translators between the input language
to the destination language. A compiling operation consists of two steps:
the first one is the analysis step where the compiler “understands” the input
language and the second step is the synthesis step where the equivalent of
the program is being produced in the destination language. We will explain
some concepts about compiler design we heavily used for the implementation
of SecurePL.
1.2.1 Lexical Analyzer
The lexical analyzer is the first phase of the compiler. It’s main task is to
read the input of characters from the source program and generate a list of
tokens (sequence of characters that have a collective meaning) as output that
will be used for syntax analysis. The lexical analyzer and parser are in close
interaction with each other. Upon receiving a “get next token” command from
the parser the lexical analyzer starts reading from the input stream until it
can identify the next token. For the lexical analysis part of the project we
used the UNIX tool flex as a scanner generator for lexical analyzing.
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1.2.2 Parser
The parser obtains a list of tokens from the lexical analyzer and verifies that
the string can be generated by the grammar of the source language. Thus a
parser is a component in a compiler that takes the input of list of tokens and
converts it to a data structure that is more suitable for further processing and
checks for syntax error at the same time. The output the parser generates can
be in the form of a parse tree, abstract syntax tree or any other hierarchical
structure that can be traversed and used for further processing of the input
source code.
1.2.3 Parse Tree and Abstract Syntax Tree
A parse tree is an ordered rooted tree that represents the syntactic structure
of a string according to some formal grammar. In a parse tree the interior
nodes are labeled by non-terminals of the grammar while the leaf nodes are
labeled by terminals of the grammar.Even though they are related concepts
the parse trees and abstract syntax trees are different constructs both used
in compilers. Whereas a parse tree is the tree representation of the structure
of the string an abstract syntax tree is the representation of the syntax of
the input code. In an abstract syntax tree each node of the tree represents
a construct occurring in the source code. It is “abstract” in the sense that
there may be some constructs that do are not represented in the tree bur are
present in the original code.
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1.2.4 Syntax Directed Translation
Syntax-directed translation is a method of translating a string into a sequence
of actions by attaching one such action to each rule of a grammar. Thus,
parsing a string of the grammar produces a sequence of rule applications.
And Syntax-directed translation provides a simple way to attach semantics
to any such syntax. In syntax directed translation grammar symbols are
associated with attributes to associate information with the programming
language constructs that they represent and the values of these attributes are
then calculated by the semantic rules associated with the production rules.
There is no limit as what data an attribute may hold, it can hold any type
on information. By the evaluation of these semantic rules the compiler may
generate intermediate codes. Not only limited to generation of intermediate
code the evaluation process can be used for evaluating anything.
1.3 Previous Secure Multiparty Computation Projects
and Compiler
Besides our implementation of a secure multiparty computation programming
language there are two recent projects that also focus on secure multiparty
computation.
1.3.1 VIFF, the Virtual Ideal Functionality Framework
VIFF is a framework which allows you to specify secure multi-party compu-
tations in a clean and easy way. VIFF allows you to do secure multi-party
computations, in which a number of parties (three or more at the moment)
10
execute a cryptographic protocol to do some joint computation. Built using
python the VIFF project is mainly a set of python classes that enables a user
to create SMC applications without the need to implement the actual proto-
cols, like secret sharing or encryption, that are used in SMC operations.[11]
1.3.2 Secure Multiparty Computation Language
The Secure Multiparty Computation Language is a domain specific program-
ming language for secure multiparty computation. It is a high-level, domain-
specific language, which allows programmers to express concepts such as
clients, server, and operations on secret values directly using a special syntax
and control structures tailored to the domain of SMC. [12]
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2 Secret Sharing
In cryptography, secret sharing refers to any method for distributing a secret
among participants each of which get a share of secret. In secret sharing
schemes there is a secret α which is shared among n participants. The
secret can be recovered only if a certain condition is met, so that among
n participants any group of t+1 have to come together to be able to recover
the secret. This method is called t-private secret sharing .
In this chapter we first introduce some additive and polynomial secret
sharing methods. Based on these methods we also show how secure multi-
party computation can be done . After the introduction the basic additive
and polynomial secret sharing method we will introduce a new secret sharing
called Pseudo Random Secret Sharing which will be used later on for the
secure multiparty comparison of secret shared values. After PRSS we will
show a new novel modified secret sharing method which allows us to do se-
cure multiparty computation in Asmuth Bloom Secret Sharing Scheme. And
finally we will talk about bounds on how many multiplication and addition
can be done without and with user interaction in mainly Shamir and Asmuth
Bloom secret sharing scheme.
2.1 Additive Secret Sharing
As will become more clearer later while introducing pseudo random secret
sharing we will also work with additive secret sharing schemes. In additive
secret sharing scheme the sum of the shared values gives the secret. By
definition this secret sharing scheme is a t=n-1 private secret sharing scheme
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where for less than n players it is impossible to recover any data about the
secret. Additive secret sharing can be over any ring.
Additive secret sharing of a secret α ∈ F simply consists of n random
shares α1, α2, ..., αn such that
α =
n∑
i=1
αi
Here since the secret shares all are random elements chosen uniformly from
the field F there is no way that n-1 players can get any information about
the secret using their shares.
2.2 Shamir Secret Sharing
Polynomial Interpolation
In the mathematical sub field of numerical analysis, polynomial interpolation
is the interpolation of a given data set by a polynomial. In other words,
given some data points (such as obtained by sampling), the aim is to find a
polynomial which goes exactly through these points. Given a set of n+1 data
points (xi, yi) where no two xi are the same, one is looking for a polynomial
p of degree at most n with the property[3]
p(xi) = yi , i = 0, 1, 2, 3, ..., n
Lagrange Interpolation Polynomial
In numerical analysis, a Lagrange polynomial, is the interpolation polynomial
for a given set of data points in the Lagrange form. Given a set of k+1 data
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points (x0, y0), ..., (xk, yk) where no two xi are the same, the interpolation
polynomial in the Lagrange form is a linear combination
L(x) =
k∑
j=0
yjlj(x)
of Lagrange basis polynomials
lj(x) =
k∏
i=j, i6=j
x− xi
xi − xj
Van der Monde matrix
In linear algebra, a Van der Monde matrix, is a matrix with a geometric
progression in each row, i.e., an m× n matrix:
V =

1 α1 α
2
1 · · · αn−11
1 α2 α
2
2 · · · αn−12
1 α3 α
2
3 · · · αn−13
...
...
... . . .
...
1 αm α
2
m · · · αn−1m

or
Vi,j = α
j−1
i
The Van der Monde matrix is used for the dimension reduction and ran-
domization steps of the secure multiplication protocol of Shamir Secret Shar-
ing Scheme.
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2.2.1 Decomposition and Recovery in Shamir Secret Sharing Scheme
For some given data α the goal is to divide it into n parts α1, ..., αn such
that:
1. knowledge of any t+ 1 or more pieces makes α computable
2. knowledge of any t or fewer αi pieces leaves α completely undetermined
(in the sense that all its possible values are equally likely).
The original shamir secret sharing scheme is based on linear interpolation.
Given t + 1 points in the 2-dimensional plane (x1, y1), ....., (xk, yk) . With
distinct xi ’s , there is one and only one polynomial q(x) of degree t such
that q(x) = yi for all i [13].
Decomposition Process in Shamir Secret Sharing Scheme
To divide a secret α into pieces αi , pick a random t degree polynomial
q(x) = a0 + a1x+ ...atx
t in which a0 = α , and evaluate:
α1 = q(1)
α1 = q(2)
...
...
...
αn = q(n)
Recovery Process in Shamir Secret Sharing Scheme
Given any subset of k of these αi values (together with their identifying
indices), it is possible to find the coefficients of q(x) by interpolation, and
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then evaluate α = q(0) .
2.2.2 Secure Multiparty Computation in Shamir Secret Sharing
Scheme
Given two secrets α and β shared by polynomials fα(x) and fβ(x) respectively
of degree k the it is possible for the players to compute c × α ,where c is a
constant integer, α + β and αβ using their local shares of α and β only.
The two linear operations are simple and for their evaluation we do not
need any communication between the players. This is because if fα(x) and
fβ(x) encode α and β , then the polynomials hγ(x) = c× fα(x) and kγ(x) =
fα(x)+fβ(x) encode c×α , α+β respectively. Thus to compute for example
α+ β each player Pi holding fα(xi) and fβ(xi) can locally compute kγ(xi) =
fα(xi)+fβ(xi) . Likewise since c is a known constant Pi can compute hγ(xi) =
c × fα(xi) . Furthermore hγ(x) is a random polynomial only if fα(x) is
random, and kγ(x) is a random polynomial if only one of fα(x) or fβ(x) was
random. The only constraint for these operations is that t ≤ n− 1 .
The multiplication operation for two secrets is a bit harder. Assuming
that n ≥ 2t+1 the free coefficient of the polynomial hγ(x) = fα(x)×fβ(x) is
αβ but there are mainly two problems with encoding αβ using the polynomial
hγ(x) :
1. The first and the most obvious one is that the degree of hγ(x) is now
2t instead of t . While this poses no immediate problems since n ≥
2t + 1 it would pose a problem for later multiplications since more
multiplications would increase the degree of the multiplication even
further.
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2. The second problem is more subtle. hγ(x) is not a random polynomial
of degree 2t . For example hγ(x) as a product of two polynomials
cannot be irreducible[4].
To overcome these two problems Ben-Or et. al.[4] proposes a method for
randomization of the coefficients and a degree reduction method in their
seminal paper. This method is later improved by Gennaro et. al.[7] Who do
both dimension reduction and randomization in one step. The only drawback
of both methods is that it requires interaction between participants to do
multiplication of two polynomially secret shared data. In this thesis we
used the method proposed by Gennaro et. al. for the multiplication and
re randomization step for secure multiparty multiplication of shamir secret
shared values.
Multiplication with Dimension Reduction
For each player Pi denote fα(i) and fβ(i) the shares that the player holds
for the secret fα(x) and fβ(x) respectively. Then the product of fα(x) and
fβ(x) is:
fα(x)fβ(x) = γ2tx
2t + ...+ γ1x+ αβ = fαβ(x)
For 1 ≤ i ≤ 2t+ 1 , fαβ(i) = fα(i)× fβ(i) so we can write:
A

αβ
γ1
...
γ2t
 =

fαβ(1)
fαβ(2)
...
fαβ(2t+ 1)

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Where the matrix denoted by A = (aij) is the (2t + 1) by (2t + 1) Van
der Monde matrix defined as aij = ij−1 . Since A is non-singular and has an
inverse. the first row of A−1 , donated by (λ1, ..., λ2t+1) , are known constants.
Then the previous equation implies that
αβ = λ1fαβ(1) + ...+ λ2t+1fαβ(2t+1)
Given polynomials h1(x), ..., h2t+1(x) all of degree t which would satisfy
hi(0) = fαβ(i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2t + 1 define H(x) =
∑2t+1
i=1 λihi(x). Note that
H(0) is exactly λ1fαβ(1) + ...+ λ2t+1fαβ(2t+ 1) and hence αβ. Furthermore
also notice that
H(j) =
2t+1∑
i=1
λihi(j)
So based on these preliminaries, after multiplying their shares, each player
Pi secret shares the multiplication of their shares with a polynomial h(x) with
the properties above then the polynomial H(x) , used for the sharing of αβ
, is exactly of degree t It also is a random polynomial because the values
λ1, ..., λ2t+1 are all non-zero values.
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Input for player Pi: The secret shared values for α and β , fα(i) and fβ(i)
1. Player Pi shares the multiplication fα(i)fβ(i) by choosing a random
polynomial hi(x) of degree t such that h(0) = fα(i)fβ(i) .
2. Player Pi gives each player Pj the secret shared value hi(j) for 1 ≤ j ≤
2t+ 1
3. Each player Pj computes his share of αβ via a random polynomial
H, i.e. the value H(j) , by locally computing the linear combination
H(j) =
∑2t+1
i=1 λihi(j)
Figure 1: Multiplication of Secret Shared Values Using Shamir Secret Sharing
Scheme
2.3 Asmuth Bloom Secret Sharing
The Chinese Remainder Theorem
The Asmuth Bloom secret sharing scheme is based on the Chinese remain-
der theorem, which states that, given n congruences x ≡ x1 mod m1 , x ≡
x2 mod m2 , ... , x ≡ xn mod mn , where m1, ...,mn are co-prime there exist
exactly one solution in [0,M − 1] where M = m1 ×m2 × ...×mn .[2, 9]
2.3.1 Decomposition and Recovery in Asmuth Bloom Secret Shar-
ing Scheme
In the Asmuth Bloom secret sharing scheme, the secrest are integers in the
interval [0, p− 1] where p is a prime number. Secrets are shared among n
players. the secret sharing scheme has n public moduli: p < m1 < m2 <
... < mn which are chosen subject to the following:
1. gcd(mi, mj) = 1 for i 6= j
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2. gcd(p, mj) = 1 for all i
3.
∏t+1
i=1 mi > p
∏t
i=1 mn−i+1
Here, as before n denotes the number of participants, and t+1 is the number
of different participant shares required to reconstruct the secret. Finally let
Mr =
∏t+1
i=1 mi.
Decomposition Process in Asmuth-Bloom Secret Sharing Scheme
The decomposition process begins with a secret α . Assuming that 0 ≤ α <
p , y = α + Ap where A is a blinding factor chosen subject to he condition:
0 ≤ y < Mr
For i = 1, ... , n the secret shares for each participant are then computed as
yi = y mod mi
Recovery Process in Asmuth-Bloom Secret Sharing Scheme
To recover x , it suffices to to find y . If yi1 , yi2 , ..., yir are known then
by, Chinese remainder theorem y is known modulo N =
∏t+1
j=1 mij . Since
N ≥ Mr this uniquely determines y thus α [2].
The Asmuth-Bloom secret sharing scheme is a perfect secret sharing
scheme. Assuming a coalition with t − 1 members, no information about
the secret can be obtained by this coalition[2]. Using the perfect secret shar-
ing scheme of Asmuth Bloom, to be able to do secure multiparty computation
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some distance has to be created between the secure zone, which is the se-
curity zone where no information is revealed, and recoverable zone, which is
the zone where the players can recover the secret. To create the necessary
distance for secure multiparty computation, we made some modifications on
the original Asmuth Bloom secret sharing scheme.
2.3.2 Secure Multiparty Computation in Asmuth Bloom Secret
Sharing Scheme
The original asmuth bloom Secret sharing scheme does not allow neither
additive nor multiplicative secure multiparty operations without losing the
ability to recover the secret. But in this thesis we introduce a new modified
Asmuth bloom Secret Sharing scheme which allows us to do addition and
multiplication without losing the ability to recover the secret. The limits on
how much addition and multiplication can be done based on secret sharing
parameters will be discussed later in this chapter.
Modified Asmuth Bloom Secret Sharing Scheme
The parameters p < m1 < m2 < ... < mn are chosen according to the
same conditions with the original Asmuth-Bloom secret sharing scheme. Fi-
nally let
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Mr =
t+1∏
i=1
mi
Ms =
s−1∏
i=1
mn−i+1
Mn =
n∏
i=1
mi
Here, as before n is the number of participants, t + 1 the number of shares
required for reconstruction of the secret and s the maximum number of par-
ticipants who can gain absolutely no information (the minimum security
parameter) about the secret when they combine their shares.
Decomposition Process in Modified Asmuth Bloom Secret Sharing
Scheme
The decomposition process begins with a secret α . Assuming that 0 ≤ α <
p , y = α + Ap where A is a blinding factor chosen subject to the conditions:
1. 0 ≤ y ≤ M
2. pMs ≤ M ≤ Mr ≤ Mn
Here M is the security parameter which defines the secure zone.For i =
1, ... , n the secret share for each participant Pi is then computed as
yi = y mod mi
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Recovery Process in Modified Asmuth Bloom Secret Sharing Scheme
This is the same as the original Asmuth Bloom secret sharing scheme.
Addition and Multiplication with Modified Asmuth Bloom Secret
Sharing Scheme
With the modification we made to the construction phase of the Asmuth
Bloom secret sharing scheme, we created a semi safe zone between pMs and
Mr which allows us to do multiplication and addition until we reach the
barrier of Mr . When two secrets are shared among n players with Asmuth
Bloom secret sharing scheme, it is possible to do computation without re-
vealing the secrets. Suppose that α and β have been shared as
αi = α + Ap mod mi
βi = β + Bp mod mi,
for i = 1, ..., n a possible secret share of α + β is
(α + β) + (A+B) p = (α + Ap) + (β +Bp) ≡ αi + βi mod mi,
which can be computed locally by each player. Likewise a secret share of αβ is
(αβ) + (AB + αB + βA) p = (α + Ap) (β +Bp) ≡ αiβi mod mi.
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The problem is that (α + β) + (A+B) p is potentially as large as 2M , and
(αβ) + (AB + αB + βA) q is potentially as large as M2, when α + Ap and
β + Bp can be as large as M . If the result, γ + Cp is larger than Mr e can
no longer guarantee the unique recovery of the secret ( In this case the sum
or addition of two secrets ).
In general after a additions and b multiplications the result γ + Cp can
be as large as (a + 1)M (b+1) . To compute such an expression and be able
to recover the result we need:
(a + 1)M (b+1) ≤ Mr ≤ Mn
Notice that the secrecy threshold is not reduced since qMs ≤ M ≤ (a +
1)M (b+1). For the calculation we use M = pMs because it is the smallest
possible value, and it gives the largest number of possible additions and
multiplications before an overflow occurs.
2.4 Replicated Secret Sharing Scheme
The replicated secret sharing scheme is a bit different in term of setup from
the previous secret sharing schemes introduced in this chapter. In this secret
sharing scheme instead of building the secret sharing based on how many
players out of n can reconstruct the secret, the main focus is on which players
can reconstruct the secret by combining their secret shares. This secret
sharing scheme was first introduced by Ito, Saito and Nishizeki in 1987[8]
and further developed by Benaloh and Leichter in 1988[5].
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In replicated secret sharing scheme the secret can be divided among a set
of P trustees such that any “qualified subset” of P can reconstruct the secret
and any unqualified subset cannot. The qualified subsets in this secret shar-
ing scheme are called access structures. For any arbitrary access structure A
a subset S of players is called a qualified set if S ∈ A and an unqualified set
if S /∈ A . In this setup a maximal unqualified set means a set S of unqual-
ified players where any unqualified set of T would hold |T | ≤ |S| . So for a
threshold structure t the number of elements in the maximal unqualified set
would be |S| = t .
Decomposition in Replicated Secret Sharing Scheme
In this secret sharing method a secret is shared among all the sets (up to 2|P |
) of the access structure A , divide the secret among each member of the set.
So in the worst case, each of the n trustees have to hold on the order of 2n
shares.
Let A be all subsets of trustees and T be the set containing all maximal
unqualified subsets so we can assume T ∈ A. In a replicated secret sharing
scheme a player secret shares a secret α by first creating additive secret shares
over the number of elements in T . I.e. by choosing random numbers αT
such that
α =
∑
T∈T
αT
A secret share αT is then distributed to all players Pi where i /∈ T . Thus a
replicated secret share of any player Pi will consist of shares αT where i /∈ T
.
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As an example consider the set of players P = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} for five players
where each element is the unique id of each player. For a secret sharing with
a threshold t = 2 where there is need for more than 2 players to recover the
secret. the Set containing all maximal unqualified subsets would be
T = {{1, 2} {1, 3} {1, 4} {1, 5} {2, 3} {2, 4} {2, 5} {3, 4} {3, 5} {4, 5}}
Since the number of elements in T is 10 we secret share α into 10 additive
secret shares α{1,2}, α{1,3}, α{1.4}, ..., α{4,5}. Finally each player Pi get a secret
share of α such that T ∈ T and i /∈ T , thus the final distribution of secret
shares would be:
Player ID Secret shares In Possession
1 α{2,3}α{2,4}α{2,5}α{3,4}α{3,5}α{4,5}
2 α{1,3}α{1,4}α{1,5}α{3,4}α{3,5}α{4,5}
3 α{1,2}α{1,4}α{1,5}α{2,4}α{2,5}α{4,5}
4 α{1,2}α{1,3}α{1,5}α{2,3}α{2,5}α{3,5}
5 α{1,2}α{1,3}α{1,4}α{2,3}α{2,4}α{3,4}
In this secret sharing scheme a secret α is divided into
(
n
t
)
secret shares
and each player gets
(
n−1
t
)
secret shares. So we see that replicated secret
sharing scheme is a very inefficient secret sharing scheme.
Reconstruction in Replicated Secret Sharing Scheme
Since the secret is divided additively among the share holders, just as in an
additive secret sharing schemes when more than t+1 players join their shares
they will have all the shares required to additively reconstruct the secret α
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2.5 Pseudo Random Secret Sharing
The last secret sharing method which will be used in secure multiparty com-
parison is pseudo random secret sharing. The method of pseudo random
secret sharing is used to convert secret shares of a random number which is
shared using a replicated secret sharing into a shamir secret shared random
number. Thus it enables the users to create secret shared random numbers.
This method is introduced by Cramer, Damgaard and Ishai, thus this section
will be based on their paper: Share conversion, pseudo random secret sharing
and its applications to secure comparison[6].
Even though in terms of reconstruction complexity, replicated secret shar-
ing scheme is easier to compute (modular addition instead of Lagrange in-
terpolation) its nature that the number of shares is
(
n
t
)
, and the amount of
data each player has to hold as a share is
(
n−1
t
)
, makes the secret sharing
scheme inefficient for larger numbers of players. Even though there is such
a drawback to this secret sharing scheme it has a key property: the secret
shares αT created from a secret are totally independent from each other. So
shares of a random secret s ∈ K consists of replicated instances of random
and independent values from K. This is not the case for any other secret
sharing scheme like shamir secret sharing scheme because there the secret
schares αi are different point of a single random polynomial, thus all related
to each other.Using this property of replicated secret scharing scheme it is
possible to create shamir secret shared pseudo random values without any in-
teraction among the players if the players have access to a previously shared
randomness.
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2.5.1 Conversion from Replicated Shares to Shamir Shares
Suppose that a secret α has been shared according to the t-private replicated
scheme where A is an access structure and n the number of total players,
thus
α =
∑
A⊆[n]:|A|=n−t
αA (2.1)
where αa has been given to all players in set A .
To convert these replicated secret shares to shares of α according to the t-
private shamir secret sharing scheme, each player Pi is assigned the the point
i on the shamir sharing polynomial. Now, for each set A ⊆ [n] of cardinality
n− t , let fA be the unique t - degree polynomial such that:
1. fA(0) = 1, and
2. fA(i) = 0, for all i ∈ [n] \A.
Each player Pj can then compute their share βj of the shamir secret sharing
by
βj =
∑
A⊆[n]:|A|=n−t,j∈A
αAfA(j) (2.2)
2.5.2 Pseudo Random Secret Sharing
In 2.5.1 we explained the conversion of a replicated secret share to shamir
secret share. Based on this method the main observation would be if the
secret α is some random value, all replicated shares αA would be independent
and and random. Hence the initially distributed αA can be used as keys to a
pseudo-random function PRFψ.(.), and as long as the participating players
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agree on a common input a to the function, they can compute ψαA(a) and
replace this value with αA in the formula (2.2) in 2.5.1. Thus each player Pj
would compute its share βj of the random secret α as:
βj =
∑
A⊆[n]:|A|=n−t,j∈A
ψαA(a)fA(j)
In this method note that, if the field F, where the elements are chosen,
is of characteristic 2 this protocol can be modified so that the shared values
are guaranteed to be 0 or 1 by choosing a pseudo random function (PRF)
that outputs 0 or 1.
2.6 Bounds on non-interactive multiplication
2.6.1 Shamir Secret Sharing Scheme
Given two secrets α and β shared by polynomials fα(i) and fβ(i), respectively
of degree t the aim is to calculate αβ. Recall that, when each participant
multiplies their shares they get the multiplication of the secret in the constant
term, we discussed earlier that this is not enough to do secure multiplication.
Even under the assumption n ≥ 2t + 1 which enables us to do at least one
multiplication before the degree of the polynomial exceeds the number of
participants and resulting an overflow we still have to do at least randomiza-
tion of the coefficients of the resulting polynomial. To overcome this problem
Gennaro et-al[7] introduced a one step degree reduction and randomization
method. The drawback of this method is that it requires interaction be-
tween participants. So even under the assumption of n ≥ 2t + 1 even after
one multiplication, coefficient randomization and degree reduction has to be
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applied to the secret shares so that even after multiplication the secret can
be recovered using at most n participants. The method described in [7] is
basically to randomize the coefficients of the new polynomial and re share
the secret among n participants.
As a result we conclude that based on t and n where t is the degree of
the polynomial of the secret, and n is the number of total participants it is
not possible to do non-interactive multiplication. Even if n ≥ 2t+1 because
after each participant multiplies their share of secret the new polynomial is
no more a random polynomial and re-randomization has to be done among
participants to protect the security of the scheme.
2.6.2 Asmuth Bloom Secret Sharing Scheme
Here we will analyze the modified Asmuth-Bloom secret sharing scheme to
see how many multiplications can be done before an overflow occurs and the
secret turns out to be unrecoverable. Earlier in section 2.3 we mentioned that
based on the chosen moduli for the Asmuth-Bloom secret sharing scheme we
can define three values as:
Mr =
t+1∏
i=1
mi
Ms =
s−1∏
i=1
mn−i+1
Mn =
n∏
i=1
mi
Later on, while explaining the decomposition protocol of the modified
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Asmuth-Bloom secret sharing scheme, it is mentioned that to decompose a
secret α among n participants, assuming that 0 ≤ α < p , y = α + Ap
where A is a blinding factor chosen subject to the conditions:
1. 0 ≤ y ≤ M
2. pMs ≤ M ≤ Mr ≤ Mn
Theorem 1 The number of non-interactive multiplications is related to the
security parameters n and s
To create the largest semi-safe zone between M and Mr we assume that
M is the smallest possible value thus;M = pMs andMr is the largest possible
value thus Mn. Since we are using close relative prime moduli m1,m2, ...,mn
and prime p we can assume that all of them are in the form of 2b + x. Here
x is a variable different for each moduli/prime and b the base bit length of
these number. Since all of the moduli are close integers after discarding the
differences x. Then the values Ms and Mn can be rewritten as:
Ms =
s−1∏
i=1
2b,
Mn =
n∏
i=1
2b.
and the M value would be
M = 2b ×Ms.
After evaluating the multiplications we get
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Ms = 2
(s−1)b,
Mn = 2
nb,
therefore
M = 2sb.
Based on these calculations after a− 1 multiplications for the secret still
to be recoverable Ma ≤Mn inequality has to hold.
Ma ≤ Mn
2(sb)×a ≤ 2nb
log2(2
(sb)×a) ≤ log2(2nb)
sba ≤ nb
a ≤ n
s
So based on n and our security parameter s, which is the number of
participants which cannot gain absolutely no information about the secret,
the number of multiplications that can be done can be written in terms of
the ratio of the number of participants to the security parameter. So finally
we can say that as long as the upper bound in the number of multiplications
holds, the participants can do non-interactive multiplications using only local
shares.
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3 Comparison
In chapter 2 we introduced different secret sharing methods and how to do
secure multiparty computation with them. In this chapter we will explain a
method to do secure multiparty comparison.
In cryptography secure multiparty computation was first suggested as a
problem in a paper by Andrew C. Yao[1]. The problem was later known
as the millionaire’s problem. The problem introduced by Yao was that two
millionaires wanted to compare their wealth but neither of them wanted the
other party to know his/her wealth. Yao presented a solution to this prob-
lem which we explained in section 1.1.1. But the solution to do comparison
was not practical and was too computationally heavy to be used in real life
applications. With the introduction of secret sharing based secure multi-
party computation methods, algebraic operations could be done without any
problem in terms of computational power. Even though algebraic secure
multiparty computation was practically possible there still was no efficient
or practical comparison protocol. The comparison protocol we implemented
in SecurePL to do comparison of secret shared values is based on the protocol
that was presented by Tomas Toft in Workshop on “Practical Applications
of New Research in Cryptography”1 and implemented for the VIFF project
[14].
1http://people.sabanciuniv.edu/pedersen/panrc08/
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3.1 Toft Comparison
3.1.1 Comparison
Let [α] and [α′] be two secret shared values; the aim of the comparison
protocol is to compute a secret sharing of which one of these two values is
greater than the other one. Thus trying to calculate
[β] = [α]
?≤ [α′] ∈ {0, 1}
To do this comparison we assume that both α and α′ are of bounded size (l
bits) and that α 6= α′. Also all computations have to be modulo p > 2l+k+2k
where l is the number of bits the inputs are and k is the security parameter.
And finally to be able to do comparison the last assumption is that there
is a source of secret randomness. For real life implementation the first two
assumptions can be achieved without any problem. To get a shared source of
randomness the pseudo random secret sharing method which was explained
in section 2.5.2 will be used.
Since there is no algebraic method to do comparison the best method to
do efficient multiplication without being unable to use algebraic methods is
to convert the problem to another problem that can be solved efficiently.
3.1.2 Initial Problem Transformation
The problem of comparing two secret shared values is converted to a simpler
problem which can be solved using algebraic methods. First the value α′ is
34
subtracted from α in two’s complement
[γ] = 2l + [α]− [α′] .
From this equation we just have to extract the l + 1th bit of γ to get which
one of these two secret shares is greater. If the values of l + 1th bit is 1 then
α is greater than α′ and if it is 0 then α′ is greater than α. So basically
[γ]− [γ mod 2l]
is almost the result. Since it is impossible to open the secret [γ] without
revealing the difference between the secret values thus revealing information
that can make one player learn the secret of another player we add a l+k bit
random integer which is shared as bits before reconstructing . For random
bit values [r1] , [r2] , ..., [rl+k] generated using pseudo random secret sharing
we first calculate
[r] =
l+k∑
i=1
2i−1 [ri]
to get a random number that is secret shared among all players. Then we
add this random l + k bit values to [γ] and open the value
δ = [γ] + [r]
thus we get
[
γ mod 2l
]
=
(
δ mod 2l − [r mod 2l]) mod 2l
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the final mod 2l in this equation can be achieved by comparing
[
r mod 2l
]
and δ mod 2l
3.1.3 Comparing [r] and δ
To do the comparison between
[
r mod 2l
]
and δ mod 2l each party has to
calculate:
[ηi] = [σ] + δi − [ri] + 3
∑
j>i
δj ⊕ [rj] ,
where the product of [ηi] ’s will be 0 if [r] > δ . After revealing λ = [v]
∏
[ηi]
the result would be (λ == 0) ⊕ (σ == −1) where σ ∈ {1,−1}is generated
randomly before calculation by each player. So finally the comparison boils
down to l + 1 multiplications of the [ηi] values.
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4 SecurePL
4.1 Introduction
The main design goal for this thesis is to create a toolbox so that people with
no knowledge about cryptography can create applications that use secure
multiparty computation. To achieve this goal a two layered architecture is
being used.
The first layer of SecurePL, which is also the layer interacting with the
user, is the SecurePL programming language and compiler. In this layer the
compiler takes the user created program and converts this SecurePL code to
C++ code which is later fed into a C++ compiler to generate the final code.
The second layer acting transparently to the user, consists of arithmetic
libraries which are used to do secure multiparty computation. These libraries
handle all the operations needed to do secure multiparty computation from
secret sharing to network communication. Even though this layer is trans-
parent to the user, the modular architacture of SecurePL allows the end user
to develop his/her own libraries to do secure multiparty computation.
In this section we will first introduce the tools used in the implementation
of SecurePL and later on go into the implementation details of SecurePL by
introducing the arithmetic libraries and programming language.
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Figure 2: SecurePL Architecture
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4.2 Base Protocols, Libraries and Tool kits
4.2.1 Flex
Flex is a program generator designed for lexical processing of character input
streams. It accepts a high-level, problem oriented specification for character
string matching, and produces a program in a general purpose language which
recognizes regular expressions. The regular expressions are specified by the
user in the source specifications given to flex. The flex written code recognizes
these expressions in an input stream and partitions the input stream into
strings matching the expressions. At the boundaries between strings program
sections provided by the user are executed. The flex source file associates the
regular expressions and the program fragments. As each expression appears
in the input to the program written by flex, the corresponding fragment is
executed.
Flex is a free software alternative to Lex the lexical analyzer. Flex is
mostly used together with the parser generator Bison. The original flex was
written by Vern Paxson around 1987. According to the GNU manual the
description of flex is:
“flex is a tool for generating scanners: programs which rec-
ognize lexical patterns in text. flex reads the given input files,
or its standard input if no file names are given, for a description
of a scanner to generate. The description is in the form of pairs
of regular expressions and C code, called rules. flex generates as
output a C source file, ’lex.yy.c’, which defines a routine ’yylex()’.
This file is compiled and linked with the ’-lfl’ library to produce
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an executable. When the executable is run, it analyzes its input
for occurrences of the regular expressions. Whenever it finds one,
it executes the corresponding C code..”
4.2.2 Bison
Bison is a general-purpose parser generator that converts an annotated context-
free grammar description into a "Look Ahead Left-to-right Rightmost" (LALR)
C or C++ parser which can parse a sequence of tokens that conforms to that
grammar.In SecurePL Bison and flex are used in conjunction to generate
a compiler that takes a simplified C-like language as input and produces a
C++ code that works in parallel when run across different computers.
4.2.3 Message Passing Interface (MPI)
Message Passing Interface (MPI) is a specification for an API that allows
many computers to communicate with one another. It is used in computer
clusters and supercomputers. It is basically a language independent protocol
used to create parallel programs to run on different machines but in parallel.
Both point to point and group communication is supported in MPI.
Its language independent structure and scalability and ease of use is the
reason that MPI handles the communication operations in SecurePL. Also
the player IDs used for the shamir secret sharing and other Id required algo-
rithms are the rank values taken directly from MPI.
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4.2.4 NTL
NTL is a high-performance, portable C++ library providing data structures
and algorithms for manipulating signed, arbitrary length integers, and for
vectors, matrices, and polynomials over the integers and over finite fields.
Since the standard 32 bit integer type of C++ is not enough to handle the
operations especially for comparison and secure multiplication which requires
up to 67 bit numbers even while working in a 32 bit field made it necessary to
use a high precision big number library. Also the supplied number theoretical
functions and algorithms makes the operations in fields much easier.
4.3 SecurePL Compiler
The SecurePL compiler is the first and only component that the end user
will interact with. The aim of this compiler is to convert the input program
to a C++ compatible secure multiparty computation based parallel applica-
tion. The input language for the compiler is a simplified version of ANSI-C
programming language. Since all the operations for multiparty computation
and paralleling are handled by the underlying libraries which are the second
component of the toolbox the end user does not have to have prior knowledge
about secure multiparty computation or parallel programming.
While developing an application to do secure multiparty computation
across different users the developer only has to have knowledge about which
input is coming from which user in the computation group. By getting input
from specific users any application which can be generated by the input
language grammar can be created so that all the data is secret shared and
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all computations are secure.
4.3.1 Input Language
The current version of SecurePL supports two variable types, constraint
blocks and loops.
Supported Variable Types and Data types. The current supported
variable types in SecurePL are int and bool. The integer type implemented
in the current secure multiparty computation library is of unbounded size.
Thus values greater than default C++ 32 bit integers can be used without
any overflow or precision loss. The boolean type is the same as C++ bool
and can have two values true or false. Even though ANSI-C or C++ supports
array types the current version of SecurePL does neither allow nor support
arrays or pointers. Also even though the converted code is converted to
C++ code user defined types like classess or structs are not supported in the
current version.
Supported loops and constraints. Among the different loop types sup-
ported by C/C++ the only supported loop type is the While loop. Since
the other looping types like “for” or “do/while” are syntactic variations of
the same operation we chose to implement only one type of loop to keep
the input language simple. As for constraint blocks both IF and IF/ELSE
blocks are supported by SecurePL. The usage of both these block types is
implemented the same as C/C++ programming language.
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4.4 Implemented SecurePL Libraries and Functions
4.4.1 Configuration
The Configuration class is basically the storage class of SecurePL. This class
is transparent to the user. By providing a config.xml file containing the
necessary configuration values:
• Prime modulo p.
• PRSS required replicated secret shares.
• The max number of bits k which is basically a predetermined value set
by players.
• The security parameter k which is mostly 30.
The values in the configuration class are auto-loaded during program start.
Thus the user has no access to the class values.
The Configuration Class Definition with comments describing each mem-
ber:
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class Conf igurat ion
{
public :
Con f igurat ion ( ) ; //The d e f a u l t c on s t ruc t o r o f the c l a s s
stat ic ZZ n ; //The number o f p l a y e r s in the network
stat ic ZZ t ; //The t h r e s h o l d
stat ic ZZ p ; //The prime modulo
stat ic ZZ l ; //The t h e o r e t i c max number o f b i t s
stat ic ZZ k ; //The s e c u r i t y parameter f o r
stat ic ZZ ID ; //The ID of the curren t p l aye r g i ven by
MPI
stat ic std : : map<st r i ng , unsigned char∗> rT ; //The
r e p l i c a t e d s e c r e t shares o f a random s e c r e t
} ;
Figure 3: Configuration Class
4.4.2 sint
The sint class is also another user transparent class implemented. This class
handles the secret shares of the data in the program. The main purpose
of this class is to be an int class placeholder. For the current version of
SecurePL when a player initializes an int type variable in the input program
this variable’s type is converted to sint while converting to C++ code. the
constructor of sint is responsible for secret sharing and distributing actual
values to secret shared values. When a sint variable is constructed using
a constant in-code value the player with the lowest ID first secret shares
the open data and then distributes the secret shares to other players as
appropriate. Player specific construction of sint variables are handled by the
read functions which will be explained later.
The class definition with comment for explaining each member is as fol-
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lows:
class s i n t
{
public :
s i n t ( ) ; // d e f a u l t c on s t ruc t o r which s e t s va lue to 0
s i n t (ZZ va l ) ; // consruc tor t ha t s e c r e t shares v a l
and a s s i gn s the s e c r e t shared va lue to won
s i n t ( s i n t& rhs ) ; // copy cons t ruc t o r
~ s i n t ( ) ;
ZZ value ; // va lue o f the s e c r e t share o f input
i n t e g e r
void Hide (ZZ va l ) ; // h ide s an i n t e g e r input and
re tu rns the corresponding s e c r e t share [ ID ]
public :
s i n t operator+( s i n t& b) ; //mathematical
opera to r s to do a l g e b r a i c opera t i ons
s i n t operator−( s i n t& b) ;
s i n t operator ∗( s i n t& b) ;
s i n t operator /( s i n t& b) ;
s i n t operator ∗(unsigned int& b) ;
s i n t operator=(unsigned int& b) ;
} ;
Figure 4: sint Class
4.4.3 ShamirSharer
The shamirsharer class is the class that handles creation of secret shares.
When constructing the class the shamir secret sharing parameters have to
be specifically defined for each instance of the class and there is no method
for setting some static parameter. This implementation choice was on pur-
pose because especially for comparison both secret sharing over GF (p) and
GF (256) are needed to accommodate this need each instance has to be re-
initialized with new parameters. And also just like the previous classes this
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class is also user transparent which means the user does not have to know
anything with regards to shamirsharer to write its SecurePL code.
The class definition with explanatory comments:
class ShamirSharer
{
public :
ShamirSharer (void ) ; // De fau l t c ons t ruc t o r
~ShamirSharer (void ) ;
ShamirSharer (ZZ num, ZZ t , ZZ prime ) ; //Constructor
private :
ZZ n ; // number o f p a r t i c i p a n t s
ZZ r ; // number o f p a r t i c i p a n t s needed f o r recovery
ZZ p ; // prime p f o r the f i e l d to work in
public :
SharedData∗ ShareData (ZZ data ) ; // s e c r e t shares an input
based on n , r parameters
ZZ ReconstructData ( SharedData∗ sha re s ) ; // r e c on s t r u c t s
the sharer by lagrange i n t e r p o l a t i n g them
ZZ ReconstructData ( SharedData∗ shares , ZZ recombPoint ) ;
// r e con s t r u c t by lagrange i n t e r p o l a t i o n over an
a r b i t a r y po in t
} ;
Figure 5: ShamirSharer Class
4.4.4 ShamirLib
This header file contains all the secure multiparty computation operations
that are currently implemented. The previous classes are used by this class
to do any algebraic operation securely. Addition, subtraction, multiplication
and comparison of sint values are implemented in this library. also initial-
ization of common parameters and communication through MPI with other
players is also an integral part of this library. Configuration settings are also
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handled by this library. There are some routines implemented in SecurePL
for interaction with the player or mathematical operations.
Getting Input From User. The implemented input output operations
to get data from sure are also integral parts of the Shamble library. The
currently supported read operations which has to be known by the end user
to get some information from the user while writing SecurePL code are:
• fRead(File source file, int &destination, unsigned int userId): Here the
source file is a File object which contains the data that has to be read
by the user, destination is the variable that will be loaded, and lastly
the last parameter userId is the user that has the data for that specific
variable.
• sRead(int &destination,int userId): this function is the same as the
above function but the only difference is that instead of using a file to
read the data this function gets the input from the standard input.
Revealing secret variables Besides reading and getting information re-
vealing secret shared variables is also implemented in this class. Two modes
of revealing are implemented in the current version. when the user wants to
reveal some variable in SecurePL the user can choose either to reveal it to
only one player with specific Id or to the whole network. The functions that
implement this operation are
• RevealVariable(int variable,int userId): This function reveals the vari-
able to a specific user ith userId
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• RevealAll(int variable): This functions reveals the secret variable to all
users in the network.
Comparison The current version of SecurePl allows only comparing of two
secret shared values and no comparison against a constant values is allowed.
Algebraic Operations. The implemented and currently available alge-
braic operations in SecurePL are addition, multiplication, subtraction and
division. Other algebraic operations are planned to be added in future ver-
sions of SecurePl.
4.5 User Implemented Libraries
As of now there is only ShamirLib implemented that can be used to do
secure multiparty computation, but there is no restriction on that and the
end user can implement its own secure multiparty computation library. In
the case where the user wants to use his/her own library and not the built-
in library while compiling the SecurePL code the user has to supply the
compiler with the classes to replace int and bool also has to supply with
the library header file name that will replace the built-in library. Also
another requirement is that all library implementations for SecurePL have to
have a Initialization() function to initialize library parameters. If there no
such need for a function like this it can be implemented as an empty function.
The compilation options for SecurePl are:
• SecurePL source_file destination_file : To use SecurePl compiler
with built in libraries
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• SecurePL source_file destination_file int_replacement_class
bool_replacement_class main_library_header : To use with cus-
tom libraries.
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5 Conclusion
Since the concept of secure multiparty computation was introduced lots of
different secure computation methods were proposed. But despite the fact
that there exist many different algorithms and methods to do secure multi-
party computation none of them had any practical usage. The reason was
either because there was no practical method to do secure multiparty com-
putation or because the methods and algorithms were too complicated and
no framework existed to ease the burden on developers trying to develop
secure multiparty enabled applications. The aim of this thesis was to make
a programming interace and toolbox so that even people with no knowl-
edge about security or cryptography could develop secure multiparty
applications.
We achieved this goal with the current version of SecurePL compiler and
implemented ShamirLib. Thanks to the compiler and accompanying library
it is possible for a person to write an application without being concerned
about security or cryptography. A simple example would be a solution to the
problem introduced by Yao in 1982[15], the very same problem that started
the concept of secure multiparty computation: The millionaire’s Problem.
There is a sample solution offered by Yao which we destribed in 1.1.1 but to
use this solution one has to have knowledge of encryption, oblivious transfer
and circuit evaluation besides knowing how to write code. To contrast this
we offer a solution where a person who knows how to code can write a
solution to Yao’s millionaire problem without getting hindered by lack of
knowledge about security or cryptography. An example source code to solve
Yao’s Millionaire problem would be
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void main ( )
{
int a ;
int b ;
sRead (a , 1 ) ;
sRead (b , 2 ) ;
i f ( a<b)
{
cout << "B i s r i c h e r " ;
}
else
{
cout << "A i s r i c h e r " ;
}
return ;
}
Figure 6: Sample SecurePL Code
In this example the program asks Alice and Bob to input their wealth
using standard input and then reveals which one of these two players is
richer. Since all data handled by the implemented library is secret shared
no one gains information about the other player’s wealth. Also since the
implementation of the library stores all data as secret shared values even the
player cannot extract the his/her original data once the data has been secret
shared and distributed to all players, because after distribution the original
data is not kept in memory whatsoever.
Further development of SecurePL might allow users to differentiate be-
tween secret and non secret integers. At the moment there is no difference
between a regular and a secret integer. By this non discriminating structure
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we can be sure that everything is secure but the main drawback resulting
from this operation is that even for simple loop operations or iterations more
than necessary processing power is needed. So giving the ability to a user to
choose which variables have to be secret and which ones not will increase the
performance drastically.
Input output operations in SecurePL also have some room for improve-
ment. Especially the data read function has no iterative read property and
data is read from a source file always starting from the beginning. This
operation can limit the use of read from file operations.
Finally we can say that the current version of SecurePL is ready to be used
for daily operations so that these operations can be done in parallel and se-
curely. But just as mentioned above there is still some room for improvement
so that the practical secure multiparty computation toolbox becomes more
powerfull and fast and will be capable of handling more complex operations.
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